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Accountability of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance 
 
Steve Charnovitz* 
 
 
  The issue of the accountability on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in global 
governance has received increased attention in recent years. The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
the issue, the consider whether any public problems exist, and to make recommendations on what 
should be done. 
 
I.  The Historical Context 
 Whenever an analyst begins a new study of an international policy problem, a reflection on 
how the problem has been analyzed in the past can be useful.  An early consideration of NGO 
accountability is Rerum Novarum, the 1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor.1 
Contrasting civil society with the “lesser societies,” the encyclical states that the latter, the private 
associations, are “now far more common than before.”2 The encyclical offers “. . . cheering hope for 
the future provided always that the associations We have described continue to grow and spread, and 
are well and wisely administered.”3  Although it concedes that the State should watch over these 
societies of citizens banded together in accordance with their rights, the encyclical says that the State 
“should not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for things move and live 
by the spirit inspiring them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from without.”4 Taking 
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note in particular of societies of working men, but seemingly making a more general 
recommendation, the encyclical counsels that all such societies, “have the further right to adopt such 
rules and organization as may best conduce to the attainment of their respective objects.”5 I read this 
discussion as saying that although the private associations need wise self-administration, the state 
should have a light hand in overseeing them.  The same sentiment was expressed decades earlier by 
Alexis de Tocqueville who in discussing potential government regulation of the ideas of associations, 
warned that “. . . a government can only dictate precise rules. It imposes the sentiments and ideas 
which it favors, and it is never easy to tell the difference between its advice and its commands.”6 
 Although the term NGO was not in use in the 19th century, it did come into use at least as 
early as 1920.  For example, in that year, Sophy Sanger used the term “non-government organisation” 
in a discussion of how such organizations had not been able to be present in 1906 during the first 
multilateral negotiations on labor treaties.7 Sanger contrasted this pre-war practice to the advent of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919 which provided clear opportunities for the 
participation of “non-Government Delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial 
organisations, if such organisations exist, which are the most representative of employers or 
workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries.”8  
 A question regarding the selection of the ILO worker delegate from the Netherlands arose in 
the third (1921) session of the International Labour Conference when the Dutch government’s choice 
was contested by the Netherlands Confederation of Trades Union.9 The Conference extended the 
                                                
5Id. paras. 55–56. 
6Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vol. 2, Part II, Chapter 5). 
7Sophy Sanger, Practical Problems of International Labour Legislation, in E. John Solano (ed.), 
Labour as an International Problem 135, 136 (1920). 
8Treaty of Versailles, art. 389. 
91 World Court Reports, Advisory Opinion No. 1, 113, 115. 
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credential to the delegate chosen by the Dutch government, but asked the ILO Governing Body to 
request the Council of the League of Nations to seek an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) regarding this disagreement.  This became the first matter to come before 
and be decided by the PCIJ which, in 1922, found no violation in how The Netherlands had made its 
selection.10  In considering the case before it, the Court welcomed oral statements from the 
International Labour Office and two international labor union federations.11 The openness of the PCIJ 
to statement by NGOs was an important episode in the history of the development of the NGO role in 
international law. If a similar question were to come to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)  today, 
the ICJ would probably not allow NGO participation.  No NGO participation in the ICJ has occurred 
since 1946 when the ICJ was established and the last requests by NGOs for an opportunity to submit 
amicus briefs in non-contentious cases were denied.12 
 The ILO Constitution is unusual in positing that the nongovernmental delegates are to be 
“representative” of organized constituencies within a country.  Typically, the constitutions of 
international organizations that provide for NGO participation do not call for a representative body or 
suggest that the role of the NGO is to represent anyone in particular.  For example Article 71 of the 
U.N. Charter states that “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence.”13 Thus, the stated rationale for the NGO being consulted is the concern of the NGO 
rather than its membership or representativeness.  
                                                
10Id. at 121. 
11Id. at 116. 
12See generally Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International 
Judicial Proceedings, 88 AJIL 611, 624 (1994). 
13U.N. Charter, art. 71. 
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 Nevertheless, when it implemented this provision in 1950, the U.N. Economic and Social 
Council established a set of principles among which was that the consulted organization “shall be of 
recognized standing and shall represent a substantial portion of the organized persons within the 
particular field in which it operates.”14 This requirement, to a large extent, has been carried forward 
into the current ECOSOC credentialing rules, adopted in 1996. These rules state that the NGO “shall 
be of recognized standing within the particular field of its competence or of a representative 
character.”15 These rules also state that “The organization shall have a representative structure and 
possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective 
control over its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate 
democratic and transparent decision-making processes.”16 Thus, the claim that an ideal NGOs is 
representative was contributed to the United Nations by governments not by overreaching NGOs. 
 A final important historical development that should be noted was the open attitude by the 
League of Nations toward NGOs.  Recognizing that the League would be dealing with both semi-
public bureaux (i.e., groups containing government members) and private associations on a daily 
basis, and seizing on the spirit of Article 24 of the League of Nations Covenant which, according to 
the Secretariat, required “that the League of Nations should follow closely and should encourage 
every international movement . . . ,” the Secretariat began publishing a Handbook of International 
Organisations in 1921.17 The Handbook was periodically updated and covered what we would today 
call intergovernmental organizations, transgovernmental networks, and NGOs.  The handbook was 
                                                
14Review of Consultative Arrangements with Non-Governmental Organizations, Resolution 288(X), 
27 February 1950, para. 5. 
15Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, 
Resolution 1996/31, para. 9. 
16Id. para. 12. 
17League of Nations, Handbook of International Organisations 9 (1921). 
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organized with an excellent classification by function (e.g., “Politics and International Relations: 
Pacifism”) and provided valuable information on each organization’s address, year of organization, 
object, membership, governing body, finances, activities, and history.  In my view, the initiative 
taken by the League in 1921 to publish this handbook was one of the most important 
intergovernmental acts in the 20th century to recognize the legitimacy of NGOs and to improve their 
transparency. 
 These episodes regarding community expectations as to the NGO role provide an illustrative 
window into the rich history awaiting scholars in the field and are not meant as a synoptic treatment 
of the overall historical context, which in any event would be far beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
II.  The Contemporary Debate on NGO Accountability  
 A good starting point for jumping into the contemporary debate on NGO accountability is the 
recent study by Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane on “Accountability and Abuses in World 
Politics.”18 The authors identify two “theoretical models”  or “basic concepts” of accountability—
delegation and participation—that offer distinct answers to the question of who is entitled to hold 
power-wielders accountable.  In the delegation model, the accountability holders are those who 
entrust or authorize power.  In the participation model, the accountability holders are those affected 
by the actions of the power-wielders.  Grant and Keohane conclude that both models are important, 
and that an effective accountability system should combine elements from both, and their analysis 
here is cogent and convincing. 
 Another important conclusion in their study is: “If governance above the level of the nation-
state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate accountability need to be 
                                                
18Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses in World Politics, 99 APSR 29 
(2005). 
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institutionalized.” Grant and Keohane catalog and evaluate the current accountability mechanisms for 
global power-wielders such as multilateral organizations, NGOs, transgovernmental networks, firms, 
and states.  They find that in world politics, accountability for most power-wielders is likely to be 
less-constraining than optimal, but that the answer is not simply more accountability.  Instead, the 
world needs “more intelligently designed accountability systems” that are sensitive to the variety of 
possible mechanisms and their shortcomings and sensitive to the normative claims of those affected 
by global entities.  In that conclusion, I concur. 
 The authors make another very important point that I want to highlight.  Grant and Keohane 
call for “. . .  abandoning the belief that global accountability, to be genuine, must conform to 
abstract, maximal principles of democratic organization.” They reach this conclusion in two steps: 
first, by admitting the difference between democratic nations, on the one hand, where there is a 
“clearly defined public” to provide responses to the fundamental questions about accountability, and 
the global level, on the other hand, where there is no public that can function in this way, and second, 
by stating that “There is no simple analogy that can be made between domestic democratic politics 
and global politics.” In this way, they escape from the pessimistic trap laid by Professor Robert Dahl 
who applies a traditional democratic prism to international organizations and then concludes that a 
“democratic deficit” is an inevitable likely cost of all international government.19  Although Grant 
and Keohane admit that “democratic standards for accountability are not met at the global level,” 
they claim that because the issue of accountability should not be narrowed to that of democratic 
control, it should be possible to improve accountability in world politics.  I very much agree with that 
conclusion, and point out that it may not be inconsistent with Dahl’s analysis as  
he seems to be addressing the democratic quality of international organizations rather than their 
accountability per se or the breadth or depth of participation within them. 
                                                
19Robert A Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in Ian Shapiro 
& Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds.), Democracy’s Edges (1999) at 19, 34.  
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 Having noted some of the many points in Grant and Keohane’s analysis on which I agree, let 
me now discuss some points of puzzlement or even disagreement starting with their definition of 
“accountability.” The authors explain that accountability implies that certain actors have a triad of 
rights to: (1) hold other actors to a set of standards, (2) judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities  in light of these standards, and (3) impose sanctions if they determine that these 
responsibilities have not been met.  I am confused about both the standards and the sanctions. 
 With respect to standards, Grant and Keohane explain that accountability presupposes a 
relationship between the power-wielders and those holding them accountable where there is a 
“general recognition” of the legitimacy of the “operative standards for accountability” or the 
“accepted standards for behavior.”20  This definition links the availability of accountability to a 
recognition or pre-supposition of clear standards—a condition that sometimes may exist (e.g., 
accounting standards) yet often does not.  In my view, the term “accountability” is often used in a 
wider sense than this definition—that is, to include situations where the power-wielder may not have 
accepted any clear standard shared by the community that may assert an accountability claim.  If I am 
right about that, then either the term accountability needs to be more broadly defined, or we may need 
to add another term to the debate to capture the claims that do not have standards.  For example, one 
might discuss the responsibility of power-wielders to those who are affected by their decisions. 
 As I read Grant and Keohane, however, they are discussing “accountability” beyond the 
instances where standards exist, as they define them. To give one example, Grant and Keohane state 
that “the process of democratic elections can be endorsed readily as an effective mechanism for 
accountability . . . .” Although elections provide for assessment and choice, surely no substantive 
standards exist for the way that the accountability holders—namely, the voters—decide who to vote 
for.  Each voter makes her decision individually based on her own frame of reference.  Elections do 
                                                
20Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 29–30.  They also suggest that an accountability process 
requires “prior obligations.” Id. at 30. 
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not require an agreement among voters as to the appropriate standard for judgment and certainly do 
not require that politicians know in advance, and/or concur with, a discrete set of standards that will 
be used. Thus, while I agree with Grant and Keohane that constitutional democratic governments “are 
accountable to their citizens,” such accountability, in my view, does not spring from judgments based 
on jointly-agreed standards. 
 One implication of the actual way in which they use the term “accountability” is that the 
absence of standards in many global governance decisions is not a reason to deny the possibility of 
achieving accountability. If I am right about that, then there would not be any need to add another 
term to the debate. 
 Another puzzling example of how Grant and Keohane use the term “standard” involves the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  They claim that WTO attention in the Doha Round to 
agricultural subsidies demonstrates an “accountability process” because the WTO “has been moving, 
haltingly, toward restricting agricultural subsidies” through “policies [that] reflect prevailing norms 
insofar as they have are accepted by powerful governments . . . .” To them, this episode “illustrates 
the importance of standards of behavior.”  Leaving aside the question of whether the WTO should be 
considered a purposive actor (an issue I address elsewhere), the negotiations on agricultural subsidies 
are hardly the application of a standard of behavior to subsidizing governments.  To the extent that 
the current standard of behavior in WTO rules restricts agricultural subsidies, that standard can be 
enforced through dispute settlement outside the Doha Round.21  What is occurring in the Doha Round 
                                                
21Thus, the other point made that Grant and Keohane make about the WTO is on target.  They 
observe that states have delegated to the WTO powers of supervisory accountability over their own 
trade actions.  Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 39.  The term “accountability” here is used 
consistently with their definition because the supervisory role of WTO dispute settlement is based on 
pre-agreed standards as to the review process and the substantive law to be applied.  My one 
reservation is that I do not agree that states truly delegate supervisory accountability.  A state cannot 
delegate authority that it does not possess and in the absence of the WTO or other trade treaty, there 
is no inherent authority of one state to supervise or hold others accountable for their official trade 
actions.  Grant and Keohane acknowledge this in their analysis.  See id. at 30. 
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is that governments are discussing a change in trade rules that would alter the current standards of 
behavior and update the prevailing international norms.  The many NGOs that are supporting new 
WTO disciplines on agricultural subsidies may view their efforts as making the WTO more 
accountable to the needs of the poor, but I would doubt that they view their advocacy as holding the 
WTO or its member governments to a pre-established standard of conduct.  
 I am also puzzled by the way that Grant and Keohane use the term “sanction.”  They see 
sanctions available at the domestic level and contrast that to the international level where they find 
that “sanctions main the weak point in global accountability . . . .” They emphasize that “the principal 
means in domestic democracies of participatory sanctions—elections—is not available on a global 
basis.”  While I agree that elections are not global, I disagree with the author’s assumption that 
elections are sanctions.  Whatever else might be said about Election Day 2004 (November 2) in the 
United States, it was hardly the national day of sanction!  In my view, elections in the United States 
provide the public a chance to choose their representatives for the next term and to decide various 
referenda.  If Smith replaces Jones as the congressman, I do not think that Jones has been sanctioned 
in the usual sense of the word.  By viewing elections as the accountability sanction, Grant & Keohane 
set a precondition for accountability that will unnecessarily make the international level appear less 
accountable than the national level.    
 Another concern I have is that Grant and Keohane are too quick to contrast the international 
level characterized by “the absence of a coherent and well-defined global public” with the domestic 
or national level where “those affected by the power-wielders are generally understood to be those 
subject to the law of the polity, so it is fairly easy to determine who has a right to participate.”  In my 
view, the appropriate public is not always well-defined in any territory or at any level of governance.  
Consider a few questions from the United States:  Should felons have a right to vote?  Should 
residents of the District Columbia or Puerto Rico have voting representation in Congress?  Should 
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non-residents of New York who have to pay taxes in New York have the right to vote in New York?22  
 Or how about Congressman Tom DeLay, the Majority Leader of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and frequent target of public criticism.  DeLay is a Member of Congress because he 
was elected by his district and in particular by the 149,901 citizens who voted for him in 2004..  He is 
Majority Leader because he was elected without opposition in the House Republican Conference.  
DeLay’s democratic legitimacy cannot be contested as a matter of law, but one could argue that with 
so many people in the United States being affected by DeLay, the relevant public to decide whether 
he should have so much power is broader than the 149,901 individuals who voted for him in the 22nd 
Congressional district of Texas and the 231 House members who did so in Washington.  Appearing 
on ABC’s “This Week” on 10 April 2005, Senator Rick Santorum defended DeLay explaining that 
“Now you may not like some of the things he’s done. . . . That’s for the people of his district to 
decide, whether they want to approve that kind of behavior or not.”  In my view, while Santorum 
properly states U.S. Constitutional law and practice, it does not take much imagination to perceive a 
broader community in the United States that is being disenfranchised from being able to directly act 
against DeLay’s abuses of power. 
 Grant and Keohane ask the central question: “Who is entitled to hold power-wielders 
accountable for abuses?,” and they provide a useful answer by identifying and examining seven 
accountability mechanisms in world politics.  In my view, there is an even broader question that 
should be considered which is who is entitled to influence the use of power and authority at the 
global level, or for that matter any level of governance.  Grant and Keohane state that in world 
politics today, “there is no juridical public on a global level” and “no sociological global public,” and 
that “a genuine global public comparable to publics in well-established democracies does not exist.” 
                                                
22See Tony Mauro, N.Y. Appeals Court: Telecommuter Must Pay State Tax, The Legal Intelligencer, 
31 March 2005, at 4. 
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That conclusion may well be true, but in my view, Grant and Keohane do not give sufficient attention 
to the basic unit of the public, any level of governance, which is the individual sentient human being. 
 Considerations of public control of authority and power should begin with the individual, and 
because I start with that assumption, I believe that the current debate about accountability in global 
governance should give more attention to the important contributions of Myres S. McDougal and 
Harold D. Lasswell.  In their 1959 article in the American Journal of International Law, “The 
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,” McDougal and Lasswell describe a 
“world social process” in which the participants “are acting individually in their own behalf and in 
concert with others . . . .”23  They emphasize that “The ultimate actor is always the individual human 
being who may act alone or through any organization,” and note in particular “associations which “do 
not concentrate upon power but primarily seek other values.”24 Attention to the role of private 
associations is one of many ways in which McDougal and Lasswell anticipated the current debate 
about NGOs. 
 By starting with the individual, McDougal and Lasswell avoid two analytical traps that many 
commentators get stuck in.  First, because individuals are seen as the active participants, the world 
social and power process can be viewed as “expanding circles of interaction” or as a “series of arenas 
ranging in comprehensiveness from the globe as a whole . . . to nation states, provinces and cities, on 
down to the humblest village and township.”25 In this analytical approach, there is no need to explain 
why individuals should be able to participate at broader (higher) levels of decisionmaking just as they 
do in narrower (lower) levels.  Second, in positing the expanding circles, McDougal and Lasswell 
                                                
23Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of 
Public Order, 53 AJIL 1 (1959) at 7. 
24Id. at 8.  More recently, Tom Franck has given careful attention to the role of autonomous 
individuals in national and international law.  See Thomas D. Franck, The Empowered Self (1999). 
25McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 23, at 7, 8. 
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avoid the “impossible separation of national and transnational law.”26 The jurisprudence of human 
dignity they propose is applicable to all levels. 
 In my view, the notion of the individual being governed in a multitude of arenas is empirically 
convincing and normatively valuable.  On any given day, the individual may be confronted with the 
dictates and decisions of his homeowner community, employer, local government, provincial 
government, national government, and international organizations.  The distance between the 
individual and his homeowner community may be closer than the distance to the United Nations, but 
the ability of the individual to influence any of the authoritative decisions may be very limited.  
Consider, for example, the innocent victims who suffer collateral damage as a result of sanctions 
ordered by the U.N. Security Council.27 Or the plight of Prince Charles and Camilla Parker Bowles 
who after seemingly squaring their plans to marry in Windsor Castle with the dictates of Church and 
State, were forced to change the venue to Windsor’s town hall after learning that the relevant 
ordinance would have required that the Castle be open for public marriages during the next three 
years.28 Or the individuals dying of fatal illnesses who are being denied potentially effective drug 
treatments due to precaution by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.29 Or the women trying to fill 
prescriptions for legal drugs who are being frustrated by pharmacists who use their delegated 
                                                
26Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society (1997) at 32. 
27See August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the 
Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AJIL 851 (2001). On the evolving 
function of the Security Council, see Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 
AJIL 175 (2005). 
28Ben English, Charles and Camilla Must Move Their Wedding After a Legal Blunder, The 
Advertiser, 19 Feb. 2005, at 7. 
29David M. Minor M.D., Dying While Waiting for the FDA To Act, Wall Street Journal, 15 April 
2005. 
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authority as medical gatekeepers to refuse to fill prescriptions that offend the pharmacist’s sense of 
morality.30 
 The normative value of seeing the individual as the object of simultaneous, multiple levels of 
lawmaking is that the truth becomes self-evident that the individual will have an interest in 
influencing all of the authoritative decisions that affect him, including not only those made by 
officials that he has elected but also decisions made by others.  From the perspective of the 
individual, the webs of authority enveloping him may be distinct in some ways, but share a common 
imperfection in sometimes not allowing the individual to achieve his interests and promote his own 
conception of a just community order.  Grant and Keohane urge caution against the “simple analogy 
that can be made between domestic politics and global politics.”  They are right that no simple 
analogy will be sufficient.  Yet from the perspective of individual, the need to engage in politics is 
omnipresent, and although the strategies one uses in various political arenas will likely differ, the 
moral justification for action may be unified. 
 Even though the debate about NGO participation in global governance is often simplified to 
the question of the proper and legitimate role of those bodies, one should not forget that the source of 
legitimacy for an NGO begins with the individual who uses it as an instrument of voluntary 
association.31  Although most of the international legal agreements that provide for public 
participation in international organizations extend that participation to NGOs rather than to 
individuals, one prominent exception in the World Bank Inspection Panel that permits requests for 
inspection from “any group of two or more people in the country where the Bank-financed project is 
located who believe that as a result of the Bank's violation their rights or interests have been, or are 
                                                
30Ellen Goodman, Pharmacists Should Dispense Drugs, Not Morality, Deseret Morning News, 9 
April 2005; Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex Pill and Widen Fight, 
N.Y. Times, 19 April 2005, at A1. 
31Pope Leo XIII traces the idea back to Ecclesiastes (4:9) (“It is better that two should be together 
than one; for they have the advantage of their society.”).  Rerum Novarum, supra note 1, para. 50. 
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likely to be adversely affected in a direct and material way.”32 The Inspection Panel is a good 
example of a clear accountability mechanism for an international organization because the Panel 
reviews whether the Bank’s actions are consistent with the Bank’s own standards. 
 This discussion provides context for the topic of this paper which is how to think about and 
evaluate the accountability of NGOs. In particular, who should NGOs be accountable to?  How 
should they be made accountable and does that accountability properly differ from the accountability 
expected for other power-wielders?  Do the myriad functions of NGOs suggest the need for slicing up 
the analysis to look separately at these functions?  
 How one analyzes accountability will be connected to the issue of what role is legitimate for 
NGOs in global governance.  There can be a tension between the power that NGOs have and the 
accountability in place for the use of that power.  Moreover, the perceived need for accountability 
may grow insofar as one perceives the legitimacy of NGO participation to be questionable.  
 Grant and Keohane offer some importance insights regarding NGO accountability, a problem 
that they see arising because NGOs are among the “powerful entities” in “world politics.”33 Let me 
highlight five of their points.  First, like other some power-wielders such as states, NGOs acquired 
their power without delegation or authorization by entities even remotely representative of the world 
population as a whole.34  Even without delegated authority, however, “transnational civil society” 
may articulate standards by which other power-wielders may be held accountable.35 Second, the task 
                                                
32Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The World Bank Inspection Panel: About Public Participation 
and Dispute Settlement, in Tullio Treves et al. (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts and 
Compliance Bodies 187 (2004). 
33See Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 30. 
34Id. at 33.  But some exceptions exist.  For example, various components of the Red Cross 
movement have explicit or implied authority under Geneva Convention of 1949, arts. 3, 9, 26, 44.  
Another example is the U.N. Security Council which occasionally requests NGOs to provide 
assistance.  See, e.g., Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea, Res. 85 (31 July 1950).  
35Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 35. 
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of assessing accountability on a global scale differs from making assessments on a national scale.  If 
an international organization or NGO is to be judged by its global accountability, then the same 
reference point should apply to the state.  Grant and Keohane cite Andrew Moravcsik’s observation 
that critics of the EU compare it to the ideal democracy standing alone rather than to the “actual 
functioning of national democracies adjusted for its multi-level context.”36 With respect to states, 
Grant and Keohane suggest that “domestic democracy is insufficient” and that “democratic states will 
act in a biased way toward noncitizens.” Third, they argue that “international NGOs are not 
legitimated by ties to a defined public.” Fourth, they argue that “In practice, few NGOs have well-
defined procedures for accountability to anyone other than financial contributors and members—
quite a small set of people.”  On the other hand, however, Grant and Keohane take note of the forms 
of accountability that sometimes do exist for some NGOs such as fiscal accountability to donors, a 
market accountability to donors, a reputational accountability to the public, and peer accountability.37 
Fifth, they recommend that NGOs must become “increasingly transparent if they are to remain 
credible.”  
 Over the past decade, the question of the role and accountability of NGOs in world affairs has 
been given a great deal of attention by both the critics of NGOs and their defenders. Perhaps the 
sharpest critic is Kenneth Anderson who does not even get to the issue of enhancing NGO 
accountability because he is so opposed to the NGO role.38 Anderson argues that international NGOs 
                                                
36Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 37 (emphasis added). 
37NGOs seeking to retain support from the public recognize the need for transparency and donor 
accountability.  A good example is the Todd M. Beamer Foundation, set up after September 11, that 
has prepared a colorful, informative 2004 annual report and posted it on the foundation’s website.  
See http://www.heroicchoices.org. 
38Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to 
the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 371 (2001).  With regard to international NGOs, Anderson says “their 
hubris exceeds their accountability” Id. at 388. 
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are not the equivalent of civil society in a settled democratic society and thus their participation in 
international processes is harmful in two respects.39 At the domestic level, NGOs can act as protest 
and pressure organizations but their actions are not viewed as part of the democratic accountability 
process.40 Yet at the international level not featuring direct elections, NGOs offer themselves as 
substitutes for democracy, according to Anderson.  This participation can be disadvantageous 
because it will make it “ever more difficult to confront the naked and painful consequences of an 
international system that has no democratic legitimacy.”41  The second negative result from NGO 
international activism, according to Anderson, is that by refusing to conform to the results of a 
democratic process within a state and instead pursuing contrary results internationally, NGOs “seek 
to undermine the processes of democracy within democratic states . . . ,” and “many international 
NGOs are hostile to the very idea of democracy if its results might conflict with their desired results . 
. . .42 Thus, according to Anderson, international NGOs, unlike their domestic counterparts, are not 
only “undemocratic,” but actually are “profoundly antidemocratic.”43 Anderson does not explain 
exactly why international NGOs are undemocratic other than to refer approvingly to the question 
asked by David Rieff, namely, “So who elected the NGOs?”.44  Happily, in addition to the general 
study by Grant and Keohane, there is now a specific literature on NGO accountability that I will 
briefly survey. 
                                                
39Id. at 382. 
40Id. at 382. 
41Id. at 382. 
42Id. at 383, 386. 
43Id. at 383. 
44See id. at 379. 
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 Peter Spiro has sought to unpack NGO accountability by asking to whom the accountability 
can be developed.45  His answer is that NGOs should be accountable both to their constituencies and 
to process, and he frames that distinction as internal versus external accountability.  Regarding 
internal accountability to members, he suggests that the problem of accountability is exaggerated 
because there are practical constraints on NGOs (such as membership) that keep them in line.  In 
evaluating NGO internal accountability, he cautions against the “fetishization of other forms of 
association,” such as the democratic state, which is “implicitly idealized on the accountability metric, 
especially by virtue of periodic elections.”46  In Spiro’s view, voting is a “crude tool for keeping 
governmental authorities in line” and “[g]overnments can get away with an awful lot before having to 
answer to their memberships . . . .”47 Regarding external accountability of NGOs to “the system,” 
Spiro contends that it is now suboptimal because given the present informal arrangements for NGO 
participation, NGOs lack incentives to be accountable. Spiro’s proposed solution is for states to 
accept “formal inclusion of non-state actors in international decisionmaking” in order to “hold NGOs, 
as repeat players, accountable to international bargains.”48 
 Paul Wapner emphasizes comparative analysis in considering the accountability of NGOs vis-
à-vis the accountability of governments.49 He finds the “gap between citizen concerns and 
government action” to be “wide,” and notes that states are not perfectly accountable externally at the 
international level.50 He does not claim that NGOs are more accountable than states, but rather that 
NGOs are differently accountable. He points out various ways in which NGOs are accountable: They 
                                                
45Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 Chicago J. Int’l Law 161 (2002). 
46Id. at 164. 
47Id. at 164. 
48Id. at 162, 167. 
49Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in NGOs, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 197 (2002).  
50Id. at 199–200. 
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are accountable to members through exit and pocketbook, accountable to directors, accountable 
through NGO collaboration with other NGOs (the phenomenon that Grant and Keohane refer to as 
“peer accountability”), and accountable to states when NGOs seek to gain accreditation to 
international organizations.  He also points out that international-minded NGOs may have broader 
aspirations than states in seeking to promote the interests of a global citizenry in a “sovereignty-free” 
way.51 
 Benedict Kingsbury explains that the struggle to articulate a useful approach to establishing 
“rigorous accountability of non-states actors suggests that international civil society has at present 
minimal conceptual resources other than First Amendment liberalism for structuring thought about 
problems of accountability.”52 Yet First Amendment liberalism, according to Kingsbury, offers few 
means of NGO accountability except via markets, and it tends to view demands for other forms of 
accountability with suspicion. Moreover, First Amendment liberalism is not very helpful in 
addressing the participatory claims of ascriptive groups, such as indigenous peoples exercising 
governmental powers.  Kingsbury calls for the development of “[a] richer international 
constitutionalism” to help address accountability, mandate, representation, and participation.53 
 Ann Florini states that there are “troubling questions about legitimacy and accountability” of 
transnational civil society, and she argues that such questions need to be addressed.54 In particular, 
she calls for greater transparency about personnel, operations, funding sources and expenditures, and 
purposes, and further states that governments should require reporting on funding sources and 
                                                
51Id. at 203–204 (quoting James Rosenau).  
52Benedict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups 
and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 Chicago J. Int’l L. 183, 
186 (2002). 
53Id. at 183. 
54Ann M. Florini, Lessons Learned, in Florini (ed.), The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil 
Society 211, 232 (2000).   
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expenditures. She also points out that the problem of accountability is to some extent self-correcting 
because “[o]ver time, groups whose facts and arguments prove unfounded discredit themselves.”55 
 Michael Edwards is one of the world’s most thoughtful and experienced analysts of the NGO 
role in global governance.  Edwards explains that “NGO accountability is weak and problematic, 
since there is no clear ‘bottom line’ for results and no single authority to which NGOs must report on 
their activities.”56 Edwards advocates a “New Deal” in which more participation in global governance 
is granted “in return for transparency and accountability on a set of minimum standards for NGO 
integrity and performance, monitored largely through self-regulation” plus a “much larger array of 
voluntary regulations and other, non-coercive means of influencing destructive behavior.”57 Greater 
accountability, in Edwards’s view is needed both upward, to donors, and downward, to the poor.  He 
also calls for measures to level the playing field among NGOs by providing additional support for 
Southern NGO participation.  Another constructive suggestion is for fostering innovation in global 
governance through “a period of structured experimentation in NGO involvement.”58 
 Debra Spar and James Dail identify an accountability gap for measures of NGO 
performance.59 They propose an interesting central product classification (or typology) of NGO 
functions (e.g., refugee assistance and health services) and then discuss the work of Alan Fowler who 
has proposed that NGOs be assessed by their outputs, outcomes, and impact.60 Spar and Dail favor 
                                                
55Id. at 234. 
56Michael Edwards, NGO Rights and Responsibilities 19 (2000).  
57Id. at 4–5, 13 (emphasis deleted). 
58Id. at 32. 
59Debra Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-
Governmental Organizations, 3 Chicago J. Int’l L. 171 (2002). 
60Id. at 175, 177. 
 20 
Fowler’s approach, which is both qualitative and quantitative, saying that this approach “asks that 
NGOs deliver results without specifying precisely what those results need to be.”61 
 Hugo Slim has proposed a working definition of NGO accountability which is “the process by 
which an NGO holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does and what it does not 
do in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties and actively responding to what it 
learns.”62 Slim advises that this process begin by constructing a map of the NGO’s various 
stakeholders in a given situation because NGO accountability cannot be expected to be uniform 
across a wide range of NGO activity. The map may reveal conflicting interests and will help design 
the right accountability mechanisms such as social audits, a complaint procedure, etc. 
 Writing in 2000, Gary Johns raised concerns about some of the assumptions underlying the 
NGO accountability movement.63 Johns argues that when NGOs posit that they are a new form of 
democratic legitimacy or the greatest expression of democracy, then NGOs may become subject to “a 
policy of heavy-handed regulation of private associations.”64 Johns sees this path as undesirable from 
a liberal perspective, and suggests that each NGO should “claim no more than to represent a view” 
and should not seek to belittle the authority of representative democracy.65 In his view, the only 
scrutiny needed for NGOs is “the ordinary scrutiny of any group or person who seeks to make claims 
on the public,” that is, the “integrity and truth of the proposal.”66 
                                                
61Id. at 178. 
62Hugo Slim, By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-governmental 
Organisations, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2002, available online. 
63Gary Johns, NGO Way to Go. Political Accountability of Non-government Organizations in a 
Democratic Society, IPA Backgrounder, Nov. 2000, 
64Id. at 3, 14. 
65Id. at 2.  
66Id. at 5.  See Edwards, supra note 56, at 28 (“And NGOs should not, as a general principle, be held 
to higher standards of behaviour than any other institution.”). 
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 A heightened interest in achieving greater accountability of NGOs has been in the air for 
several years.  For example in 2003, the New York Times editorialized that  
. . . nongovernmental organizations, or NGO’s, are now part of the power 
structure, too. They receive donations from the public and advocate policies that 
each group claims are in the public interest.  As they become part of the 
established political landscape worldwide, these groups owe it to the public to be 
accountable and transparent themselves.”67 
 
Following that same theme, The Economist ran an influential essay “Who Guards the Guardians?” 
which put forth the “novel idea” of “auditing NGOs.”68 Actually The Economist has been more 
attentive to the phenomenon of NGOs than any other general interest journal.  In 2000, The 
Economist noted that NGOs “. . . can get into bad ways because they are not accountable to 
anyone.”69 In 2003, the Capital Research Center Foundation Watch published an article on “NGO 
Accountability” by Robert Huberty and David Riggs who lamented that many NGOs are “using their 
power to undermine individual freedom . . .  [by] promoting new international arrangements that are 
indifferent to the U.S. Constitution . . . .”70 Huberty and Riggs make several recommendations 
including a clear distinction between charitable and political activity, full disclosure of all 
government funding of NGOs, and an encouragement to NGOs to publish annual reports and make 
them available over the internet.   
 Attention to the alleged lack of NGO accountability has, not surprisingly, led to serious 
introspection by NGOs, and stepped-up efforts at setting standards for, and appraising and auditing 
                                                
67Holding Civic Groups Accountable, New York Times, 21 July 2003, at A18. 
68Who Guards the Guardians, The Economist, 20 September 2003. 
69Sins of the Secular Missionaries, The Economist, 29 January 2000.  This article ended with the 
puzzling suggestion that “The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition.” See also The Non-
governmental Order, The Economist, 11 December 1999,  
70Robert Huberty and David Riggs, NGO Accountability: What the U.S. Can Teach the U.N., 
Foundation Watch, July 2003. 
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NGOs by academics, governments, foundations, and other NGOs.  For example in 2003, the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I) was launched to help monitor the 
actions of those engaged in humanitarian activities.71 The HAP-I promotes and assists self-monitoring 
by member organizations which include well-known organizations such as CARE International and 
the Danish Refugee Council.  The most interesting development has been the establishment of NGOs 
to monitor other NGOs.  For example, the American Enterprise Institute and the Federalist Society 
for Law and Public Policy Studies have jointly set up “NGO Watch” in “an effort to bring clarity and 
accountability to the burgeoning world of NGOs . . . . “72  The web site is largely composed of news 
stories, related documentation, and policy papers.  A recent posting, for instance, reports that 
Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai issued a “stinging rebuke” to NGOs for “squandering the 
previous resources that Afghanistan received in aid from the international community.” Another 
effort, the NGO Monitor Project, was set up to examine how certain humanitarian NGOs covering 
Israel and the Middle East deviate from their mission.73  This Project is a joint venture of the Institute 
for Contemporary Affairs and B’nai B’rith International. Another NGO that is focusing on 
accountability is One World Trust. In 2003, One World Trust published a “Global Accountability 
Report” that applied the same standards to assess several intergovernmental organizations, 
transnational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations.74 The Report defines accountability 
as “a process by which individuals or organizations are answerable for their actions and the 
consequences that follow from them.”75 The Report points to eight dimensions of accountability 
                                                
71See www.hapinternatinoal.org. 
72See www.ngowatch.org. 
73See www.jcpa.org. 
74Hetty Kovach et al., Power Without Accountability? (One World Trust, 2003), available at 
www.oneworldtrust.org. 
75Id. at 3. 
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including four internal dimensions and four external ones.  One might also note that attention to NGO 
accountability comes at a time of enhanced attention to the need for greater accountability of 
everyone and everything including corporations, religious leaders, news bureaus, schools, and 
parliamentarians.76 
 In early 2005, the Consultative Board to the WTO Director-General discussed in general 
terms the issue of NGO accountability.77 The Board noted the criticism that “those lobbying for more 
access” are “often neither especially accountable nor particularly transparent themselves.”78  
Furthermore the Board stated: 
While there is now a broad recognition among member states of the UN of the 
substantial and proven benefits of non-governmental participation in 
intergovernmental debate on global issues, there are continuing concerns about 
the legitimacy, representativity, accountability and politics of non-governmental 
organizations. There is also a serious imbalance in the capabilities of non-
governmental organizations from developed and developing countries.79 
 
 Another expert group that recently gave attention to the issue of NGO accountability was the 
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, appointed by Secretary-
General Kofi Annan.  In its report of June 2004, the Panel suggested that in its practices for engaging 
civil society, the United Nations should work to define “. . . standards of governance, such as those 
for transparency and accountability.”  In particular, according to the Panel, the U.N. Secretariat 
                                                
76See, e.g., the independent investigation of CBS and 60 Minutes, January 2005, available at 
http://wwwimage.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/complete_report/CBS_Report.pdf and Larry Kudlow & 
Eileen Norcross, A Sarbanes-Oxley for Congress?, Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2005, at A10. 
77The Future of the WTO, Report of the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, January 2005 (known as the Sutherland Report). 
78Id. para. 199. 
79Id. para. 209. 
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should discuss with the private groups advising the UN “possible codes of conduct and self-policing 
mechanisms to heighten disciplines of quality, governance and balance.”80 
 Aside from occasional U.N. Security Council sanctions, the most ambitious 
intergovernmental supervision of NGOs that has come to my attention occurs in the WTO Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). This provision, which applies only to a narrow swath of 
NGOs, directs governments to “take such reasonable measures as may be appropriate to them to 
ensure that local government and non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories . . . 
accept and comply” with the TBT Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards.81 Among the requirements of the Code are that governmental and 
nongovernmental standardizing bodies shall: 
 ?Play a full part in relevant international standardizing bodies with participation, whenever 
possible, taking place through one delegation representing all standardizing bodies in the territory.
82
 
 
 ?Make every effort to achieve a national consensus on the standards to be developed.83 
 ?Publish a work program at least once every six months.84 
 
 ?Before adopting a standard, allow a period of at least 60 days for the submission on 
comments by interested parties within the territory of that Member.
85
 Take any submitted comments 
into account and, if so requested, reply to them as promptly as possible.
86
 
 
 ?Make an objective effort to resolve any complaints submitted by other standardizing bodies 
that have accepted the Code.
87
 
                                                
80We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance, Report of the Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, A/58/817, June 2004, at 59. 
81Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), art. 4.1. 
82TBT Agreement, Annex 3, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of 
Standards, para. G. 
83Id. para. H. 
84Id. para. J. 
85Id. para. L. 
86Id. para N. 
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Pursuant to its authority under the TBT Agreement, the TBT has adopted a Decision that provides 
additional principles for the elaboration of international standards.88 The Decision calls on 
international standardizing bodies to be open to the relevant bodies of all WTO Members and to 
provide participants, especially from developing countries, with “meaningful opportunities to 
participate at all stages of standard development.”89 So far, little has been done in the WTO to police 
these rules.    
 The party with potential culpability at the WTO would be the WTO Member(s) with the 
errant nongovernmental standardizing body in its territory.90 The NGO itself would not be subject to 
WTO dispute settlement even if it agrees to accept the Code of Good Practice.  In general, the WTO 
adheres to a principle of Member responsibility in which dispute settlement is always between 
governments and is directed at the government that is alleged to have violated WTO rules.   
 As far as I am aware, the only exception to this principle occurs in the WTO Agreement on 
Preshipment Inspection (PSI) in which a private party, either the preshipment inspection entity or the 
exporter, may lodge a dispute to a special panel of experts established by the Independent Entity, 
with the decision of the panel deemed as binding.91 No such disputes have yet been raised.  This PSI 
provision has interesting implications with respect to the development of global administrative law as 
                                                                                                                                                              
87Id. para. Q. This rule seems to include complaints by bodies in other countries. 
88TBT Committee, Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee Since 1 January 
1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.8, 23 May 2002, at 26 providing the Decision of the Committee on Principles for 
the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 
2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement. This Decision and its implications are discussed in Steve 
Charnovitz, International Standards and the WTO, May 2002, available in GWU Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 133 (on SSRN). 
 
89Decision of the Committee, ibid., at paras. 6, 7. 
90TBT Agreement, arts. 4.1, 14.1 (requiring that trade interests be significantly affected). 
91Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, art. 4. 
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does another anomalous WTO provision, Article 8.5 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).  Under Article 8.5, a WTO member may gain “binding arbitration” 
regarding a number of issues, one of which is a review of a decision made by WTO Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures regarding whether the conditions for a non-actionable 
subsidy have been met in a particular instance.92 This form of administrative review is unusual 
because it provides for an independent reconsideration of a decision made by a WTO Committee 
composed all of WTO members.  This provision was not used during the first five years of the WTO 
and the entire SCM Article 8 was sunsetted at that point. 
 Looking ahead, the development of an overall strategy for enhancing NGO accountability 
should consider not only the recent developments in practice, but also the projected trends.93  The 
most sophisticated study that has come to my attention is “The 21st Century NGO,” a report prepared 
by Sustainability, a strategy consultant.94 The Report compares 20th and 21st century NGOs, and 
suggests that the latter will be insiders rather than outsiders, will focus on solutions rather than 
problems, will invest heavily in networks, will seek support as a good investment rather than playing 
on guilt, will be multi-dimensional rather than single-issue campaigns, and will “adopt best practice 
in transparency, accountability and governance.”95 In its chapter on NGO governance, the report rates 
the quality of the information provided in the annual reports of 10 well-known NGOs.96  The top 
performer was CERES which created the CERES principles for corporate environmental conduct and 
established the Global Reporting Initiative, which includes an international standard for monitoring 
                                                
92Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), arts. 8.4, 8.5. 
93See McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 23, at 14–15. 
94See The 21st Century NGO in the Market for Change, undated, available at 
www.sustainability.com. 
95Id. at 2. 
96Id. at 24. 
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corporate performance on a “triple bottom line” of economic, social, and environmental 
performance.97 Thus, we see one NGO giving high marks to another well-known NGO that evaluates 
corporate performance.  Another recommendation in “The 21st Century NGO” is that funders of 
NGOs should provide core funding for NGO accountability efforts. Doubtless they have and will. 
 In summary, there is considerable agreement among commentators that NGOs do exercise 
power of sorts and that NGO activities in global governance need to be more accountable because the 
possibility of abuse exists. As Grant and Keohane note, NGO power cannot be justified as being 
delegated power from the world population or being power transmitted through an election. One 
reason why the NGO role sometimes elicits hostility is that NGOs may boast more legitimacy and a 
broader rule than the facts would justify.  An NGO may legitimately advocate what it believes would 
be in the community interest, and as Gary Johns points out, but an NGO should claim no more than to 
represent a view.  What puts NGOs on thin ice, however, is the claim to represent civil society or 
global public opinion.  If NGOs were more careful not to make absurdly broad claims about 
themselves, their activist role might be less controversial.  
 Another important theme among commentators such as Grant and Keohane, Moravcsik, 
Spiro, and Wapner is that adequate global accountability may be lacking among all of the institutions 
engaged in global governance and also that accountability itself should be looked at as a comparative 
phenomenon.  Thus, as Wapner explains, one should expect the attributes of accountability for NGOs 
to be different than for states or others.   
 Kingsbury is surely correct in calling for a richer international constitutionalism to address 
issues of accountability, mandate, and participation on a global scale.  Although I have no problem 
with the concept of “First Amendment liberalism” as justifying why states should not interfere with 
NGOs, I believe that the universal values of human liberty and self-determination involved may be 
                                                
97See www.ceres.org. 
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overlooked in using a term associated so closely with American constitutionalism.  Perhaps a better 
term might be “Part III liberalism” which is a reference to the applicable provisions in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.98 The Covenant, Article 19, states: “Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.99 Article 21 states: “The right of peaceful 
assembly shall be recognized.”100 Article 22 states, in part:  
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.  
 
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the 
protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.101 
 
None of these rights seem expressly inapplicable to the relationship between an individual and an 
international forum such as the United Nations.  The situation may be different for the right to 
participate referred to in Article 25 which seems to hinge upon citizenship: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
 
                                                
98International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
99Id. art. 19.2.  The following provision states that: “The exercise of the rights provided for in 
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; [and] (b) For the protection of national security 
or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Id. art. 19.3. 
100Id. art. 21.  The provision continues: “No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right 
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of 
public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
101Id. art. 22. 
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        (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives; . . . .102 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to do a detailed analysis of the liberalism provided for in the 
Covenant compared to that of the First Amendment, and its tensions, in the context of the exercise of 
rights on the international plane.103 One might note, however, that unlike the First Amendment, the 
Covenant does not explicitly use the language of a right “to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances,” nor does it use the language “freedom of speech.” In that context, it is interesting to note 
that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does mention “the right of every 
person to be heard, before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken . . 
.”, but this “Right to good administration” is cabined to the “institutions and bodies of the Union.”104 
Similarly the “Right to petition” in the Charter applies only to the European Parliament.105 
 Although the degree of NGO accountability today may not be sufficient, many 
commentators—such as Grant and Keohane,  Spiro, Wapner, and Florini—point out the numerous 
mechanisms and pressures that actually do promote NGO accountability and responsibility.  
 All of the commentators recognize that NGO accountability as a concept remains roughly 
defined.  Spiro offers an important distinction in distinguishing between internal and external 
accountability and this distinction seems to have been picked up in the recent analysis by 
Sustainability.  The vertical distinction offered by Edwards is similar in some ways to Spiro’s point 
but the categories of internal/external and up/down do not overlap. Slim too makes a useful analytical 
                                                
102Id. art. 25. The remainder of this article refers to voting and public service. 
103Of course, a citizen of the United States seeking to take part in the conduct of public affairs in the 
United Nations is perforce seeking to take part in U.S. public affairs, since the United States is a 
member of the United Nations. 
104Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C364/01, art. 41.1, 41.2. 
105Id. art. 44. 
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distinction in suggesting the need for maps of stakeholders that will differ by the type of NGO 
activity involved.  That idea is related to Spar and Dail’s suggestion for a typology of NGO functions.   
All of the commentators agree on is the need for more transparency of NGOs and more reporting on 
their activities.  
 One suggestion offered by Spiro and Edwards that I do not find persuasive is the idea of a 
bargain or quid pro quo whereby NGOs get greater access in return for greater accountability.  While 
I would agree with Edwards that “structured experimentation” can be useful, I cannot endorse the 
recommendation of the UN Panel of Eminent Persons that urges the U.N. Secretariat to engage NGOs 
in discussion about codes of conduct and self-policing mechanisms.  In my view, the heavy hand of 
U.N. bureaucracy would exert a negative influence and the way to promote better NGO behavior is 
through the likely continuation of present trends of increased market-driven attention by NGOs to 
their own performance and creative efforts by NGOs to evaluate one another.  The incursion of the 
WTO into NGO operations through the TBT Agreement is a little-noticed phenomenon and while 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the norms being proffered for standardizing organizations, it is 
unfortunate that the WTO itself does not yet practice what it preaches on matters such as developing 
a national consensus that builds up or providing a public notice and comment period for rulemaking. 
 
III. The NGO Accountability Challenge 
 Without a doubt, NGOs in general need to improve their governance, management, and 
performance and to be subject to more sophisticated and systematic independent evaluations.  The 
same observation is applicable to all non-profits, such as universities, not just NGO non-profits.  It is 
also applicable to profitmaking entities.  It is also applicable to governments.  It is also applicable to 
international organizations and transgovernmental networks.    
 We live in an age of standard-setting and no doubt those who run NGOs, or fund NGOs, or 
belong to NGOs could benefit from standards, best practices, codes of conduct, and certification 
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designed specifically for various types of NGOs.  A great deal of effort in that direction is ongoing.  
For example, Social Accountability International (SAI) has been asked by InterAction, an umbrella 
group of international charities, to inspect and certify the tsunami-related child sponsorship programs 
of five major NGOs (e.g., Save the Children U.S.).106 The certification requires allowing SAI to 
inspect documents and field activities, and also examines some governance issues such as director 
conflicts of interest, accuracy of advertisements, and a 35 percent cap on administrative and 
fundraising costs relative to total expenditures.  
 Accountability more narrowly understood may presuppose relevant and agreed standards but, 
as noted above, accountability more broadly defined can be sought without clearly-defined standards. 
The idea that NGOs active in global governance lack sufficient accountability has become 
conventional wisdom and I would guess that the highest waves of accountability demands on civic 
society have yet to hit the shores.  Writing in 1997, I suggested that the impact and influence of 
NGOs in the international arena may be a cyclical phenomenon.107 Certainly, over the past few years, 
criticism of NGOs has sharply increased but whether this has translated into a drop in influence 
remains unclear. 
 In my view, NGOs are extremely sensitive to threats to their influence and will take steps to 
obviate those threats.  Recognizing that NGO influence is now being undermined to some extent by 
demands for greater NGO accountability, I would predict that NGOs will be eager to cooperate in the 
expansion of the supply of accountability  mechanisms. So more efforts to improve accountability are 
on the way and will occur through most, if not all, of the six mechanisms of accountability noted by 
Grant and Keohane, namely, hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, and peer.  For example, 
                                                
106Michael M. Phillips, Big Charities Pursuing Certification To Quell Fears of Funding Abuses, Wall 
Street Journal, 9 March 2005, at A1. 
107Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 183, 268–7 (1997). 
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legal accountability can relate to the laws of the territories in which NGOs are incorporated or 
operate, and can include laws relating to tax-exempt status, financial management, employer 
obligations, and deceptive and fraudulent practices.108  When NGO activities include actions rather 
than just words, for example, ecoterrorism, legal accountability will also include adherence to 
criminal laws.  As Grant and Keohane point out, peer accountability can be especially important for 
NGOs because a poor record can impede efforts by an NGO to partner with others.109 Also they 
correctly point out that “market accountability” will be an important constraint on NGOs because 
they operate in a market for donors.110 
 Accountability mechanisms need to be tailored to NGO functions.  Thus, when NGOs deliver 
services (e.g., immunizations) to individuals, the optimal form of accountability of that function will 
be different from the accountability of the same NGO carrying out a different function such as public 
education or advocacy.  No systematic typology of NGO functions has come to my attention,111 but 
the classifier would need to consider the differences between functions such as standardization, 
labeling, intelligence collection and analysis, representation of workers, selling in the market, buying 
in the market, and various democracy-enhancement services such as raising the quality of debate or 
improving deliberation.   
 The differences between the NGO as a market participant and as a political actor would also 
shape the appropriate accountability mechanism. Thus, when NGOs perform functions similar to 
                                                
108See, e.g., Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and its 
Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 Wm and 
Mary L. Rev. 1341 (2004). 
109See Grant & Keohane, supra note 18, at 37. 
110Id. at 38. 
111A new, excellent paper analyzing NGO roles is Hildy Teegen, Jonathan P. Doh & Sushil Vachani, 
The Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value 
Creation: An International Business Research Agenda, 35 J. Int’l Bus. Stud. 463 (2004). 
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profitseeking entities, the regulation and accountability should be similar.  This would apply, for 
example, to NGOs as contractors, employers, and providers of services to individuals. 
 The functions that present the real conceptual challenge for accountability and regulation are 
the NGO’s role as a political actor.  There the concern is that NGOs lack the restraints that apply to 
other institutions such as the market or the ballot box. Yet as Grant as Keohane note, in reality, NGOs 
are subject to a large number of constraints.  As voluntary organizations, NGOs depend upon 
individuals who choose to belong to them, to work for them, to fund them, and to listen to them.  But 
the accountability concern for NGOs is that their impact may go far beyond the individuals who take 
part in it.  Contrast for example Amnesty International with Toastmasters in terms of impact on non-
participants. 
 When any government regulation is considered, the first question to ask is what the 
market/non-market failure is and whether government intervention can help to correct it.  On the 
issue of the global political activities of NGOs, I am skeptical that more oversight and regulation by 
governments or international organizations would be constructive.  In my view, Pope Leo XIII was 
right when he warned that the state “should not thrust itself” into societies and citizens banded 
together in accordance with their rights.  Government bureaucrats and politicians do not have any 
special competence to oversee NGO politics and guide them toward attainment of the common good. 
It may be that a threat of government regulation will induce some useful self-reform of errant NGO 
behavior, but in general I believe that if an action is wrong in the first place, then threatening to do it 
is also wrong. 
 An attempt to formulate a plan for greater government regulation of NGO political activities 
would run into many problems, starting with the trammels of statism.  Government regulation tends 
to be territorial but this does not match up well with the domain of NGO action which can be global 
or with the membership and participants in an NGO which can be transnational.  The difficulty of this 
spatial challenge tends to be underestimated by those who would like to see greater NGO 
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accountability to someone or something.  It is one thing to say that Global Witness, for example, 
needs to be more accountable, but quite another to specify to what sovereign authority that 
accountability should be owed. 
 It might be logical to imagine that the solution for transnational NGOs is to make them 
accountable to international organizations, but a moment’s reflection would show the impracticality 
of that path. 
 On the other hand, some international organizations might play a useful role in overseeing 
efforts to develop standards for NGOs or voluntary codes of conduct for them.  Beginning in 2002, 
the International Law Commission (ILC) began a project on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations and once that is completed, it is possible to imagine proposals for an ILC project on 
the Responsibility of NGOs. The ILC is supposedly accountable to the General Assembly but just 
about everyone is a stakeholder in its work, and the ILC has not yet adopted a suitably expansive 
view of its own accountability.  For example, the ILC does not solicit public comments on its various 
draft articles.   
 As Grant and Keohane note, there are two models for accountability by those who entrust an 
entity with power—(1) principal-agent and (2) trustee.  Both can be applicable to the relations 
between an NGO and its overseeing government, its funders, its members, its governing board, and 
its staff, but the trustee model might be the more useful one.  For both models, however, the principal 
corrective in a voluntary organization would be exit or voice rather than efforts to enforce a particular 
norm.  The members of a large NGO probably want the organization to develop expertise and utilize 
it for the purposes of the organization.  The members understand that they are usually not capable of 
knowing on any given issue whether what the NGO says is right, but if evidence comes to light that 
the NGO is often making mistakes, then the members will get concerned.  
 Although the real issue in NGO accountability is whether the NGO is thoughtful, accurate, 
and fair in its statements, most of the attention to NGO accountability has been on a different issue—
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that is, whether the NGO is representative of its members.  To me, representativeness is just a red 
herring.  If the ideas being propounded are completely wrong, then the NGO for that reason is lacking 
in accountable to the community. In other words, I would give much more weight to how useful the 
ideas are that emanate from an NGO than I would give to whether the ideas faithfully represent the 
views of the NGO’s membership.  For example, some observers might be happy for the Flat Earth 
Society to advocate flat earth policies so long as the Society’s leadership reflects the views of the 
members, but I would not.  For a more painful example, consider the most notorious NGO today, Al 
Qaeda which may be a faithful representative of its followers. 
 If the adequacy of the NGO’s representation of membership was ever a useful indicia of the 
NGO’s accountability, surely the age of the internet and blogs changes that.  For any powerful idea, 
for example, creationism, a coordinator can put together many people in many countries who will 
support it. Such a virtual NGO might not have any organization in the traditional sense but would be 
fully justified in saying that it faithfully represented its uniformly-thinking members.  But surely the 
repetition or amplification of mistaken views is hardly sufficient for NGO accountability. 
 Although much NGO activity occurs in traditional affinity organizations, we often see a 
phenomenon whereby the potential impact of governmental decisions creates a new constituency 
concerned about it.112  Individuals who may have little in common with each other will join an 
organization to promote a particular cause that unites them.  Such temporary, single-issue 
organizations may be highly representative of membership, but their accountability should be judged 
more substantively. 
 The unhelpfulness of an inquiry into the representativeness of an NGO can also be seen by 
considering the smallest of the NGOs—namely, the NGIs, the activist non-governmental individuals.  
For example, Raphael Lempkin had a great deal of positive impact on international law without 
                                                
112See Loren A. King, Deliberation, Legitimacy, and Multilateral Democracy, 16 Governance 23, 43 
(Jan. 2003). 
 36 
anyone asking whether he adequately represented himself.  His impact came because of the power of 
his ideas.  
 Just as we know, and as Margaret Mead reminded us, that even one person can make a 
difference, we also know that the quantity of members of an NGO does not reveal much about the 
quality of the NGO’s ideas.  Nevertheless, NGO leaders are prone to boast about the size of their 
memberships as if that infused the NGO with a greater legitimacy than it would otherwise have.  In 
my view, numbers matter when votes are counted but should not matter when ideas are weighed. 
 Although I have opposed making NGOs more accountable for their ideas to government 
regulators, I do not mean to suggest that governments lack tools to improve NGO accountability.  
The best way to constrain errant NGO ideas is to improve the marketplace of ideas in global 
policymaking.  At present, this market is far from perfect and governments can undertake some 
fruitful improvements.   
 Inspiration can come from many founts of western political thought.  One might recall James 
Madison in Federalist No. 51 who suggested that the “policy of supplying, by opposite and rival 
interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, 
private as well as public.”113 Or Alexis de Tocqueville who perceived that political associations “. . . 
by stimulating competition, [could be used] to discover the arguments most likely to make an 
impression on the majority . . . .”114 Or Immanuel Kant who counseled that the legislative authority of 
a nation should seek instruction from philosophers concerning the principles on which it should act 
toward other nations, and should recognize that allowing the class of philosophers to speak publicly 
“is indispensable to the enlightenment of their affairs.”115 
                                                
113The Federalist Papers, No. 51. 
114Tocqueville, supra note 6, Vol. 1, Part II, Chapter 4. 
115Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace, 1795, (Kant pagination 369). 
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 Several years ago, Daniel Esty formulated a normative theory as to how NGOs could help the 
WTO consider competing policy options.116  He explained that “An NGO-enriched WTO decision 
process would offer better competition for national governments in the search for optimal policies.”117 
I believe that Esty’s theory has more general applicability to global governance well beyond the 
WTO. 
 In seeking to promote a more robust competition of ideas, governments can structure the 
deliberative processes in intergovernmental and transnational fora so that contesting NGOs can 
debate with each other and with business groups.  The idea that the quality of NGO participation 
would improve if the discursive interface improves can be seen in the analyses of Wapner, Spiro, and 
Edwards. Spiro contributes the suggestion of accountability to “the system.”  New experiments in 
multistakeholder dialogues, for example at the Monterrey Summit, have promoted debate among 
disparate groups and can contribute to more responsible advocacy.  In that regard, one might recall 
that the original idea in 1919 for establishing a mechanism by which NGOs of different colors could 
debate ideas—the Constitution of the ILO which provides a role for employer and worker delegates 
in the formation of international labor conventions and recommendations.  In addition to this 
horizontal interface, Edwards adds the useful notion of vertical accountability, namely, that on 
development issues, the claims made by the large NGOs should be rooted in the experience at the 
local level.118 
Summary 
 Governments should not try to directly regulate the quality of advocacy of NGOs, but rather 
should improve it indirectly by establishing mechanisms that give NGOs an incentive to upgrade 
                                                
116Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, or Exclusion, 1 JIEL 123 (1998). 
117Id. at 137. 
118Edwards, supra note 56, at 19–26. 
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their own performance.  NGOs are very likely to be criticizing governments and it will be difficult for 
governments to appear to be objective were they to insist that NGO statements be honest and fair. 
 The idea of providing better mechanisms for NGO debate works well whether the issues are 
technical/scientific or hinge on values.  The WTO benefited enormously from the intellectual 
contributions of health NGOs (and Fred Abbott) who pointed out that the trade rule for compulsory 
licensing of patents could prevent a supply of essential medicines from being available to countries 
without a manufacturing capacity.119 That point was an economic and technical one.  The NGO critics 
of TRIPS also raised more general concerns about whether the WTO rules for patenting took 
sufficient account of health values.  Over many decades, NGOs have shown themselves to be adapt in 
advocacy on both the narrower technical points and the broader claims on values.  
 A great deal of literature exists on the so-called “trade-and” debates, such as trade and 
environment, trade and health, or trade and human rights.  I think that some of this literature has been 
insufficiently attentive to the broader phenomenon of cross-fertilization of international law whereby 
the norms of one body of law are infiltrated into the other.  Over the past 15 years, we have seen how 
environmental norms have found a way themselves into WTO jurisprudence and how trade norms 
have found their way into environmental treatymaking (e.g., biosafety).  This is all to the good.  
Some other examples are the application of human rights norms to the laws of war, the application of 
state responsibility to international organizations, and attempted application of development 
objectives to international intellectual property law.  Just as private corporations are being subjected 
to claims of triple bottom line and corporate social responsibility, similar tranfigurational ideas are 
being applied to international organizations and their treaties.  In my view, it is the NGOs, acting as 
“transnational norm entrepreneurs,” who, along with the publicists, are leading the way in these 
developments. 
                                                
119See the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 31(f). 
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 In the critiques of NGOs, one subtext seems to be that NGOs are pursuing only a “partial” 
interest (or a single-issue campaign), and perforce NGOs will not be accountable to the public as a 
whole which will be motivated by general interests.  Assuming that this is true and a problem, the 
solution might be to pay less attention to the NGOs or to mandate altruism.  In my view, that is the 
wrong diagnosis and the wrong solution.  It is the wrong diagnosis because partiality or private 
interest can operate as a virtue not only in markets but also in polities.  There is certainly a place for 
constitutional rules to tie government hands in order to make them less susceptible to the entreaties of 
the special interests, but in my view, such constitutional rules should not include muzzling the private 
voice.  It is the wrong solution because authoritative decisionmakers need a constant infusion of 
competitive ideas and values in order to make complex decisions in the best interest of the global 
community.  Or to quote Tocqueville, “A government, by itself, is equally incapable of refreshing the 
circulation of feelings and ideas among a great people, as it is of controlling every industrial 
undertaking.”120 
 
                                                
120Tocqueville, supra note 6, Vol. 2, Part II, Chapter 5. 
